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Daniel Thompson2, 3 
Yale Program on Financial Stability Case Study 
April 15, 2021 
 
Abstract 
On September 6, 2008, as part of a four-part government intervention, the Federal Housing 
Finance Agency (FHFA) took into conservatorship the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), 
two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that dominated the US secondary mortgage 
market. Concurrently, the FHFA, as conservator, entered into Senior Preferred Stock 
Purchase Agreements (SPSPAs) with Treasury, under which Treasury committed to provide 
funding to ensure the GSEs’ positive net worth. In return, Treasury received senior preferred 
stock and a warrant to purchase 79.9% of the GSEs’ common stock. The SPSPAs have been 
amended three times, which has placed additional restrictions and obligations on the GSEs. 
This case finds that the agreements accomplished their emergency goal of maintaining a 
positive net worth for both GSEs. However, the third amendment’s variable dividend 
formula, which was implemented in 2013, has been debated by academics and challenged 
by shareholders. As of this case’s publication, the SPSPAs are still in effect, and Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac remain in conservatorship. 
 
1 This case study is one of seven Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) case studies that examine in detail 
the various elements of the government’s rescue of the GSEs: 
• “The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module A: The Conservatorships” by Daniel Thompson 
and Rosalind Z. Wiggins.   
• “The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module B: The Senior Preferred Stock Purchase 
Agreements (SPSPAs)” by Daniel Thompson.  
• “The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module C: GSE Credit Facility” by Emily Vergara.  
• “The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module D: Treasury’s GSE MBS Purchase Program” by 
Michael Zanger-Tishler and Rosalind Z. Wiggins.  
• “The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module E: The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 
2008” by Daniel Thompson.  
• “The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module F: The Federal Reserve’s Large-Scale Asset 
Purchase (LSAP) Program” by Daniel Thompson and Adam Kulam.  
• “The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module Z: Overview” by Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Benjamin 
Henken, Adam Kulam, Daniel Thompson, and Andrew Metrick.  
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-
financial-crises/. 
2Daniel Thompson - Research Associate, YPFS, Yale School of Management.   
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At a Glance 
 
On July 30, 2008, the government passed the 
Housing and Economic Recovery Act, which, 
among other things, formed the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) as a new 
regulator for the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home 
Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) and 
certain other government-sponsored 
enterprises (GSEs), enhanced supervision 
authority over the GSEs, and provided Treasury 
with emergency authority to invest in the GSEs 
if needed. In connection with taking the GSEs 
into conservatorships on September 7, 2008, 
the FHFA and Treasury announced the Senior 
Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements 
(SPSPAs). The FHFA entered into substantially 
the same agreement with the Treasury on each 
firm’s behalf as conservator.  
 
The primary purpose of the SPSPAs was to 
ensure that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
maintained a positive net worth. Treasury at 
first committed under the SPSPAs to provide up 
to $100 billion to each firm. This was later 
increased to up to $200 billion per firm, then increased again in December 2009 to provide 
unlimited funding for 2010-2012 pursuant to a formula (Jester et al. 2018, 14-15). Beginning 
in 2013, the amount of available funding reverted to what was available at the end of 2012 
(Jester et al. 2018, 14-15).    
 
As conservator of the GSEs, the FHFA could request draws from Treasury under the SPSPAs 
to offset any losses in a quarter. The SPSPAs also established limits for the GSEs’ debt and 
portfolios.  
 
In return for its funding commitment, Treasury received $1 billion in GSE (nonvoting) 
Variable Liquidation Preference Senior Preferred Stock (superior to all other stock) along 
with a warrant to purchase up to 79.9% of the GSEs’ common stock. The SPSPAs obligated 
the respective GSE to pay a quarterly dividend equal to 10% (or 12% if delinquent) of the 
preferred stock’s Liquidation Preference, and a Periodic Commitment Fee, but Treasury 
waived, and then suspended, this fee. Amounts drawn by a GSE were added to the 
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: To maintain a positive net worth for the 
housing GSEs and to allow them to continue 
supporting the secondary mortgage market.   
Announcement Date September 7, 2008  
Operational Date September 7, 2008 
Expiration Date  Indefinite (Not 
announced) 
Amendments May 6, 2009 
December 24, 2009 
August 17, 2012   
Legal Authority HERA §1117 
Funding Commitment $100 billion per GSE 
(subsequently raised to 
$200 billion per GSE, and 
was effectively unlimited 
from 2010-2012) 
Cumulative Draws Fannie Mae- $116.1 
billion  
Freddie Mac-$71.3 billion  
Aggregate Dividends 
Paid (as of 3rd quarter 
2017) 
$275.89 billion 
Participants US Department of the 
Treasury (as Financier)  
The Federal Housing 
Finance Agency (FHFA; as 
GSE conservator)   
Senior Preferred Stock 
 Purchase Agreements (SPSPAs) 
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Liquidation Preference, as were any unpaid dividends and Periodic Commitment Fees that 
became due. In the event one of the GSEs were liquidated, Treasury would be entitled to 
receive the full amount of the Liquidation Preference. 
 
The SPSPAs were amended three times from 2008 to 2012. The first (May 2009) and second 
(December 2009) amendments adjusted the GSEs’ debt and portfolio limits. The third 
amendment (2012) changed dividend payments from a fixed rate to a variable net sweep of 
GSE profits. The third amendment also mandated that the GSEs decrease their capital 
reserves by $600 million each year, beginning at $3 billion in 2013, until they reached zero 
in 2018.  
 
The GSEs returned to profitability in 2012. Between 2008 and 2012, they drew a combined 
$187 billion under the SPSPAs to maintain solvency (CBO 2016, 1). As of September 30, 2016, 
there remained a combined $259 billion of Treasury assistance authorized but not drawn 
available under the SPSPAs (CBO 2016, 1). The GSEs had paid to Treasury approximately a 
combined $250 billion in dividends through September 2016 (CBO 2016, 1). As of that date, 
the combined liquidation preferences for the SPS stood at approximately $190 billion (CBO 




The SPSPAs were essential to maintaining the GSEs’ positive net worth throughout the crisis, 
and thus enabling the firms to continue to support the secondary mortgage market. This was 
a key factor in stabilizing the financial system, since by 2008, the private secondary market 
had all but collapsed (FCIC 2011). Despite this success, the variable dividend formula 
implemented by the third amendment has generated controversy and has led to shareholder 
lawsuits, but as of this case’s writing, courts have upheld it.  
 
Although several proposals on how to transition the GSEs from conservatorship have been 
floated, none have been successful (CBO 2016, 6-7). As of the date of publication, the firms 
remain in conservatorships, and the SPSPAs remain in effect. However, except for some 
limited summary information (see the discussion under “Outcomes”), this case focuses on 
the period from 2008 to 2013. 
322




Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement: United States Context 
GDP 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU 
converted to USD) 
$14,681.5 billion in 2007 
$14,559.5 billion in 2008 
$14,628.02 billion in 2009 
GDP per capita 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU 
converted to USD) 
$47,976 in 2007 
$48,383 in 2008 
$47,100 in 2009 
Sovereign credit rating (5-year 
senior debt)  






Size of banking system  
$9,231.7 billion in total assets in 2007 
$9,938.3 billion in total assets in 2008 
$9,789.07 billion in total assets in 2009 
Size of banking system as a 
percentage of GDP  
62.9% in 2007 
68.3% in 2008 
66.9% in 2009 
Size of banking system assets as a 
percentage of financial system 
assets  
29.0% in 2007 
30.5% in 2008 
30.3% in 2009 
5-bank concentration of banking 
system  
43.9% of total banking assets in 2007 
44.9% of total banking assets in 2008 
44.3% of total banking assets in 2009 
Foreign involvement in banking 
system 
22% of total banking assets in 2007 
18% of total banking assets in 2008 
19% of total banking assets in 2009 
Government ownership of banking 
system  
0% of banks owned by the state in 2008 
0% of banks owned by the state in 2009 
Existence of deposit insurance 100% insurance on deposits up to $100,000 in 
2007 
100% insurance on deposits up to $250,000 in 
2008 
100% insurance on deposits up to $250,000 in 
2009 














Through 2007 and 2008, as the housing market experienced an unprecedented correction, 
two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), the Federal National Mortgage Association 
(Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), continued 
to buy and guarantee loans, which provided the secondary mortgage market with much-
needed liquidity (FCIC 2011, 309-10). This was a critical role in stabilizing the market, since 
by 2008, the private secondary market had all but collapsed. By the fourth quarter of 2007, 
the GSEs had increased their share of purchases of mortgage originations to 75%, nearly 
twice their 2006 level (FCIC 2011, 312). For 2007, as mortgage defaults mounted and market 
prices of mortgage-linked securities fell, the GSEs reported annual net losses of $2.1 billion 
for Fannie Mae (first since 1985) and $3.1 billion for Freddie Mac (first ever) (OFHEO 2008, 
10–11). The contracting mortgage market and the GSEs’ recognized instability also made it 
difficult for the two companies to raise capital (FCIC 2011, 314–315).  
By September 2008, when the government intervened, the two GSEs’ outstanding 
guaranteed mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and debt totaled more than $5 trillion, and 
they had capital of only 2% (FCIC 2011, 312). Recognizing Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s 
importance to the contracted mortgage market, federal officials aimed to preserve GSE 
operations, particularly since many investors believed that the GSEs were backed by an 
implicit guarantee from the federal government (FCIC 2011, 316). Officials understood that 
the GSEs’ insolvency would have geo-economic repercussions, since foreign institutions 
(mostly central banks) held $1 trillion in GSE debt and MBS (Paulson 2010). 
Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s worsening health increased decades-old concerns that their 
regulators, the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) and the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), might not be able to properly stabilize the GSEs; 
the regulators had no authority to increase the firms’ capital requirements (FCIC 2011, 309). 
Congress passed the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA) on July 30, 2008, which 
created a new GSE regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), with enhanced 
supervisory authorities, and enabled it to take control of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, if 
necessary (HERA 2008). Section 1117 of the bill also gave Treasury emergency powers, 
expiring on December 31, 2009, to “purchase any obligations and other securities issued by 
[Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac]” (HERA 2008).  
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On September 6, 2008, the FHFA took the GSEs under conservatorship as part of a four-part 
program designed to stabilize Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 4 The Senior Preferred Stock 
Purchase Agreements (SPSPAs) were entered into the next day. Although Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac each signed a separate agreement with Treasury (with the FHFA acting on 
behalf of the GSEs as conservator), the agreements were substantially the same, and so we 
discuss them as one herein. Figure 1 depicts the overall timeline of the SPSPAs. 
 
 
4 See Thompson and Wiggins (2021) for more discussion of the conservatorship. See also Vergara (2021) for 
discussion of the Credit Facility and Zanger-Tishler and Wiggins (2021) for discussion of the GSE Purchase 
Program, the other components of the rescue plan. Wiggins et al. (2021) discusses the overall intervention 
effort. 
Figure 1: SPSPAs Key Program Features Timeline 






Draws: Quarterly draws count against 
commitment and increase Liquidation 
Preference of senior preferred stock 
Dividends: Pay 10% on senior preferred 
stock Liquidation Preference (quarterly) 
Periodic Commitment Fee: To begin 
March 31, 2011 (Amount never set) 
Portfolio Limitation: Capped at $850 
billion, with 10% reductions annually (to 
begin 2010) 
Debt Limitations: 110% of GSE debt in 
June 30, 2008 
Stock Received: 1 million 
shares of senior preferred 
stock (liquidation value of  
$1 billion) 
Warrant Received: 
Warrant to purchase 79.9% 
of Common Stock for a 
nominal price (original 
exercise price of $0.00001) 
Commitment: $100 billion 
05/06/2009 First 
Amendment 
Portfolio Limitation: Raised to $900 
billion with 10% reductions annually (to 
begin 2010) 
Debt Limitation: 120% of current 
portfolio 
Commitment: $200 billion  
12/24/2009 Second 
Amendment 
N/A Commitment: Unlimited for 
2010, 2011, 2012; return to 




Dividend: Variable; all net income less 
capital reserves to Treasury 
Periodic Commitment Fee: Suspended 
Portfolio: 15% reductions annually (not 
below $250 billion) 
Capital Reserves: Capped at $3 billion 
(2013); decreased annually by $600M 
until reaching zero 
 
Note: If the above topics were not amended, assume that they remained unchanged.  
ˡ Terms are denoted per GSE.  
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The SPSPAs were established pursuant to Treasury’s authority under HERA. The agreement 
was structured as a sale from the GSE to the Treasury of certain Variable Liquidation 
Preference Senior Preferred Stock (SPS) and a warrant, with the SPS representing an in-kind 
payment of an Initial Commitment Fee for Treasury’s commitment (the Commitment) to 
provide funds to the GSE from time to time in amounts needed to offset any losses that it 
incurred (Treasury/Fannie 2008). Treasury’s original commitment was for up to $100 
billion for each GSE (Treasury/Fannie 2008).  
If the FHFA, as conservator, concluded that a GSE’s net worth for any quarter was less than 
zero, it could request a draw under the SPSPAs equal to the GSE’s net deficit 
(Treasury/Fannie 2008). Treasury would pay the amount requested within 60 days of such 
a request, provided that the amount requested and all previous draws did not equal or 
exceed the maximum amount that Treasury was then committed to provide (Maximum 
Amount). If the amount requested and previous draws exceeded the Maximum Amount, 
Treasury would provide such lesser amount that was available.  
The FHFA was given three different timing windows to request a draw: (1) the FHFA could 
request a draw every quarter, (2) the FHFA could request an immediate draw if it decided to 
take the GSEs into receivership, and (3) the FHFA could request an immediate draw if it 
decided to liquidate the firms (Fannie 2008a). In the latter case, the FHFA would calculate 
the draw based on the GSEs’ liquidation date balance sheet (Fannie 2008a). The draws 
allowed the GSEs to maintain a positive net worth every calendar quarter, allowing them to 
fulfill senior and subordinated debt obligations and to continue to guarantee their MBS 
throughout the crisis (FHFA 2010).  
In exchange for its funding commitment, each GSE issued to Treasury (1) 1,000,000 shares 
of SPS with an initial Liquidation Preference5 of $1,000 per share ($1 billion aggregate 
Liquidation Preference) and (2) a warrant to purchase common stock representing 79.9% of 
the common stock of the GSE on a fully diluted basis for $0.00001 per share. The GSEs also 
agreed to adhere to certain obligations and restrictions contained in the SPSA agreement 
(Treasury/Fannie 2008).   
(1) Senior Preferred Stock. The SPS was senior to all other common and preferred stock, 
but junior to senior and subordinated debt (Frame et al. 2015). The SPS was perpetual and 
thus had no specified date of maturity (Jester et al. 2018). Per Treasury’s initial purchase, the 
Liquidation Preference of the SPS was set to $1,000 per share (Fannie 2008a). As discussed 
herein and noted in Figure 2, three factors could increase the initial aggregate Liquidation 
Preference of $1 billion: (1) the amount of any draws paid by Treasury to the GSE, (2) 
accrued but unpaid dividends, and (3) any Periodic Commitment Fees that the GSE chose to 
pay by adding them to the Liquidation Preference (Treasury/Fannie 2008; Fannie 2008a). 
Draws from Treasury under the SPSPAs constituted the main source of increase of the 
Liquidation Preference over time.  
 
5 Terms used herein and not defined herein refer to the defined terms as used in the SPSPA. 
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The GSEs could pay down the Liquidation Preference but not below the initial value of $1,000 
per share while the Commitment was in force (Fannie 2008a). Upon the voluntary or 
involuntary dissolution, liquidation, or winding up of a GSE, Treasury would be entitled to 
receive from the assets of the GSE available for distribution to stockholders, before any 
payment or distribution could be made on the common stock or any other class or series of 
stock of the GSE ranking junior to the SPS upon liquidation, the Liquidation Preference plus 
any dividends accrued pro rata for the current period (Fannie 2008a). Upon termination of 
the Commitment, the GSE could voluntarily pay down the Liquidation Preference in whole 
or in part (Fannie 2008a). 
As of July 2017, Fannie Mae’s Liquidation Preference was valued at $117.1 billion, and 
Freddie Mac’s was valued at $72.3 billion (Fannie 2017; Freddie 2017).  
Figure 2: Fees and Accumulations Under the SPSPAs (in billions of USD) 
 
ˡ As of third quarter 2017.  
Sources: Fannie 2008a; Freddie 2017; Fannie 2017. 
The SPS was to pay a quarterly dividend in arrears based on the dividend rate multiplied by 
the then Liquidation Preference. Treasury set the dividend rate at 10%, believing this fairly 
reflected market rates on comparable securities (Jester et al. 2018). If the GSE failed to pay a 
dividend on time, (1) the unpaid dividend would be added to and increase the Liquidation 
Preference, and (2) the dividend rate would rise to 12% and remain at that increased rate 
until the GSE paid all cumulative but unpaid dividends (including dividends added to the 
Liquidation Preference) (Fannie 2008a). With respect to dividends and distributions upon 
dissolution, liquidation, or winding up, the SPS ranked above the GSE’s common stock, all 
other outstanding preferred stock, and all other capital stock to be issued. 
The GSEs also were required to pay a Periodic Commitment Fee, accruing from January 1, 
2010, and payable quarterly beginning March 31, 2010, to compensate Treasury for its 
ongoing commitment under the SPSPAs after December 31, 2009 (Treasury/Fannie 2008). 
The FHFA and Treasury—in consultation with the Fed—were to decide the amount of the 
Periodic Commitment Fee, which would be applicable for a five-year period (and reset every 
five years) (Treasury/Fannie 2008). Treasury could at its discretion waive the Periodic 
Commitment Fee at the beginning of the year based on adverse conditions in the mortgage 
market (Treasury/Fannie 2008). The GSE could at its discretion choose not to pay the 
 Fannie Mae Freddie Mac 
Unpaid Dividends 0 0 
Unpaid Periodic Commitment Fees - - 
 Cumulative Draws $116.1ˡ $71.3ˡ 
Original Aggregate Liquidation 
Preference 
$1 $1 









Periodic Commitment Fee in cash but have it added to the aggregate Liquidation Preference 
(Treasury/Fannie 2008). Treasury, however, waived the Commitment Fee for each quarter 
beginning in March 2010 until it suspended the fee in the third amendment. Since Treasury 
never collected a Commitment Fee, the dividend constituted the GSEs’ sole cash transfer to 
Treasury. The quarterly dividend payments began to accrue on September 8, 2008, the day 
after the announcement of the SPSPAs (Fannie 2008a). 
(2) The Warrants. In addition to the SPS, Treasury also immediately received from each 
firm a warrant to purchase up to 79.9% of the firms’ common stock on a fully diluted basis. 
The warrant had a 20-year term with a nominal exercise price, initially $0.00001 per share 
(Fannie 2008b). As of this case’s writing, Treasury has not exercised the warrant. 
(3) Additional Guidelines and Restrictions. The SPSPAs required the GSEs and the FHFA 
to adhere to additional operational guidelines and restrictions, most importantly portfolio 
and debt limits. The SPSPAs set the GSE portfolio cap at $850 billion, which required a 10% 
annual reduction that began in 2010. However, the GSEs did not have to reduce their 
portfolio below $250 billion. The GSEs could not increase their debt levels to more than 
110% of their debt on June 30, 2008, which was $859.9 billion for Fannie Mae and $956.5 
billion for Freddie Mac (Fannie 2008c; Freddie 2009a).  
Without Treasury’s approval, the FHFA could not end the conservatorships, unless it moved 
the GSEs into receivership (Fannie 2008a). In addition to debt and portfolio limits, the 
SPSPAs required the GSEs to seek Treasury approval to: issue or purchase stock, pay any 
dividends (apart from those owed to Treasury), alter executive compensation, enter into 
new contracts, or consolidate or merge with another company. Without Treasury’s approval, 
the GSEs could not sell, convey, or transfer any of its assets, except for dispositions for fair-
market value: 
• To a limited-life regulated entity; 
• “In the ordinary course of business, consistent with past practice”; 
• During a liquidation of the GSE;  
• Of cash (or equivalent) for cash (or equivalent); or 
• To stay within the debt limit (Treasury/Fannie 2008). 
The First Amendment. On May 6, 2009, in response to changes in the market, Treasury and 
the FHFA amended the SPSPA, raising Treasury’s Commitment (and thus the Maximum 
Amount) from $100 billion to $200 billion per GSE (UST/Fannie 2009a). Treasury and the 
FHFA raised the GSEs’ portfolio cap from $850 billion to $900 billion and derived the 10% 
reductions (to begin in 2010) from the $900 billion cap (for example, the cap would be $810 
billion by end year 2010) (FHFA 2010). The amendment also raised the GSEs’ debt ceiling to 
$1,080 billion in aggregate par value debt (FHFA 2010). The $1,080 debt cap was based on 
120% of $900 billion, the GSEs’ new portfolio cap. The debt cap decreased by 10% annually 
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beginning in 2010, since its maximum value was calculated using 120% of the GSEs’ portfolio 
cap (FHFA 2010).  
The Second Amendment. The FHFA and Treasury amended the SPSPAs again on December 
24, 2009, just as the Treasury GSE MBS Purchase Program and Treasury Credit Facility were 
expiring.6 The December amendment increased Treasury’s commitment to $200 billion plus 
any draws during 2010, 2011, and 2012, less any surplus amount that existed on December 
31, 2012. In other words, Treasury would not count draws requested in 2010, 2011, and 
2012 as part of its $200 billion commitment, effectively providing the GSEs with unlimited 
draws during these years (UST/Fannie 2009b).   
The Third Amendment. The third amendment was entered into on August 17, 2012 (effective 
as of January 1, 2013). It increased the GSEs’ portfolio cap reduction from 10% to 15% per 
year, but not below $250 billion (UST/Fannie 2012). The amendment also capped the GSEs’ 
capital reserves at $3 billion (UST/Fannie 2013) and required reductions of $600 million 
annually until they reached zero by January 2018. At that point, the GSEs would depend on 
Treasury funds to cover their losses (UST/Fannie 2013). This reflected a “wind down” 
strategy favored by the Obama administration.  
The third amendment also required Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to submit an annual risk 
management plan to Treasury, including a detailed explanation of how each company 
planned to reduce its operations and curb taxpayer losses. The third amendment added a 
sixth exception to the GSE asset transfers (see previous page for the original five), allowing 
the GSEs to dispose of any assets that were valuated at $250 million or less without 
Treasury’s approval (UST/Fannie 2013). 
The third amendment also altered the SPSPA’s dividend structure, replacing the 10% (or 
12%, if delinquent) fixed dividend with a variable dividend (UST/Fannie 2012). This policy 
was enacted to protect the taxpayer and also to avoid the practice of the GSE borrowing from 
the SPSPAs to pay the dividend, which then increased the Liquidation Preference and future 
dividends (Thompson and Wiggins 2021). From January 1, 2013, until December 31, 2017, 
for any quarter, the variable dividend rate included the net worth amount from the previous 
quarter (if positive), less the maximum allowed capital reserve amount. Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac would not pay a dividend if their net worth fell below the capital threshold. 
From January 1, 2018, onward, the dividend would consist of the net worth amount, as the 
capital reserve amount would be zero (UST/Fannie 2012). In effect, the variable dividend 
rate and other terms adopted in the amendment limiting the firms’ accumulation of capital 
reserves amounted to a quarterly net sweep of any GSE profits to Treasury.  
December 2017 Letter Agreement. In December 2017, the Trump administration Treasury 
Department and the FHFA entered into a letter agreement that raised the maximum capital 
reserve amount for each firm from zero (as mandated by the third amendment) to $3 billion 
indefinitely, beginning in January 2018, permitting the firms to again retain earnings. Per the 
 
6 See Zanger-Tishler and Wiggins (2021) and Vergara (2021) for discussion of the Treasury GSE MBS 
Purchase Program and the Treasury Credit Facility, respectively, the additional components of the 
government’s GSE intervention. 
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third amendment, the dividend payment would consist of any positive net worth less $3 
billion, or the applicable capital reserve amount. It’s not clear if this should be read as a 
definite shift from the prior administration’s “wind down” strategy for the firms. The letter 
also mandated that $3 billion be added to the Liquidation Preference of the GSEs’ SPS 
(UST/Fannie 2017). In addition, Treasury asserted that the $3 billion capital buffer 
depended on the GSEs’ ability to continue paying dividends. According to a press release by 
Treasury, “any failure by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac to declare and pay a full quarterly 
dividend will result in the automatic, immediate termination of its capital buffer” 
(UST/Fannie 2017). 
Commenting on the letter agreement, the FHFA director argued that: 
While it is apparent that a draw will be necessary for each Enterprise if tax legislation results 
in a reduction to the corporate tax rate, FHFA considers the $3 billion capital reserve 
sufficient to cover other fluctuations in income in the normal course of each Enterprise’s 
business. We, therefore, contemplate that going forward Enterprise dividends will be 
declared and paid beyond the $3 billion capital reserve in the absence of exigent 
circumstances (Treasury 2017).  
Termination of Commitment. Treasury and the FHFA could terminate the SPSPAs for three 
reasons. First, if the liquidation end date occurred and Treasury had supplied all the 
requested funds for the liquidation end date. Second, if the GSE repaid, defeased, or 
completed by another provision its mortgage guarantee obligations and debts. Third, if 
Treasury injected the full amount of its commitment into the GSEs (Treasury/Fannie 2008). 
The status of the FHFA’s conservatorship would not affect the SPSPA, and the SPSPAs would 
continue even if the FHFA placed the GSEs into a receivership or “any other insolvency 
proceeding” (Treasury/Fannie 2008).  
A GSE could pay down the Liquidation Preference in whole or in part, but only in cash. As 
shown in Figure 3, any such paydown would be first applied to offset any unpaid dividends, 
and then any unpaid Periodic Commitment Fees, that had been added to the Liquidation 
Preference. The GSE was required to pay down the Liquidation Preference (in the stated 
order) if it issued any shares of capital stock in exchange for cash while the SPS was 
outstanding. However, if the Commitment had not yet terminated, the Liquidation 
Preference could not be paid down below the initial $1 billion (Treasury/Fannie 2008). If 
the GSE paid down the Liquidation Preference to zero after termination of the Commitment, 
the SPS would be deemed to have been redeemed and no longer outstanding. As of this case’s 
publication, however, the GSEs remain in conservatorship, the SPS remains outstanding, and 
the SPSPAs are still in effect. 
  
330




Figure 3: Repayment Priority Following Termination of Treasury’s Commitment 
 Repayment Priority 
Unpaid Dividends 1 
Unpaid Periodic Commitment Fees 2 
 Cumulative Draws 3 
Original Aggregate Liquidation 
Preference 
4 
Source: Fannie 2008a.  
Outcomes 
Following the conservatorship announcement on September 7, 2008, market demand for 
GSE debt seemed to increase (Federal Open Market Committee 2008). However, the GSEs’ 
common stock fell to about $1 (from approximately $60 per share the previous year). 
Preferred shares did not fare much better (Frame et al. 2015). In addition to the issuance of 
senior preferred stock to Treasury, the FHFA’s decision to freeze private equity likely 
contributed to the downturn in stock prices (FHFA 2017). 
Mortgage yields also fell for a brief period. The Monday following the intervention 
(September 8), the rate on Fannie Mae’s five-year debt and its mortgage-backed securities 
(MBS) dropped about 30 and 50 basis points, respectively (using five-year Treasury bond 
yields as the spread). More broadly, mortgage rates fell by 50 basis points. Following Lehman 
Brothers’ collapse on September 15, however, mortgage rates rose and quickly exceeded 
levels that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had experienced prior to the conservatorship 
(Frame et al. 2015). 
From 2008 through third quarter 2017, Fannie Mae drew an aggregate $116.15 billion under 
the SPSPA, while Freddie Mac drew an aggregate $71.34 billion, requesting only quarterly 
draws. The largest draws occurred during the first year of the conservatorship. Fannie Mae 
drew a peak sum of $19 billion in first quarter 2009, while Freddie Mac drew a peak sum of 
$30.8 billion in fourth quarter 2009. The GSEs have not requested a draw since first quarter 
2012 (see Appendix A). After Treasury expanded its funding cap in December 2009, Fannie 
Mae had $124.8 billion and Freddie Mac had $149.3 billion in commitment available from 
Treasury, which amount remains available as of this case’s publication (despite draws 
received in 2010-2012) because of the nature of the adjusted formula for accounting for 
draws adopted with the second amendment (Appendix A).  
Treasury and the FHFA passed the third amendment under more stabilized conditions for 
the housing market and for the GSEs. In 2012, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac posted annual 
profits (after paying dividends to Treasury) for the first time since 2007. When the GSEs 
became profitable in 2012, they reevaluated their deferred tax assets, which only increased 
profits further. Tax reevaluation enabled the GSEs to realize record-breaking profits in 2013, 
with Fannie Mae realizing $58.7 billion in the first quarter and Freddie Mac netting $30.4 
billion in the third quarter (Frame et al. 2015). 
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From 2008 to 2012, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac paid an aggregate $23.75 and $31.43 billion 
in dividends, respectively, as shown in Figures 4  and 5. From first quarter 2013 to third 
quarter 2017, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac paid $86.39 billion and $134.31 billion in 
dividends, respectively. Through third quarter 2017, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have paid 
an aggregate $276.8 billion to Treasury dividends and have received $187.5 billion in draws, 
which have increased the combined Liquidation Preference to $189.5 billion (Fannie 2017; 
Freddie 2017). As of July 2017, Fannie Mae’s Liquidation Preference stood at $117.1 billion 
and Freddie Mac’s Liquidation Preference stood at $71.3 billion.(Fannie 2017; Freddie 
2017). 










































Notes: Timeline: from September 2008 until September 2017. Red denotes enactment of new 
variable dividend formula. 
Source: FHFA 2019  
The GSEs never exceeded their established portfolio caps or debt ceilings. Fannie Mae’s peak 
portfolio was $817.8 billion in June 2010 (Fannie 2010). Freddie Mac’s peak portfolio was 
$867.1 billion in March 2009 (Freddie 2009b). Fannie Mae came closest to the debt ceiling 
in November 2008, with $885.6 billion (Fannie 2008c). Freddie Mac held a peak debt of 
$932.4 billion in March 2009 (Freddie 2009b). Per the third amendment, capital reserves 
were to be decreased by $600 billion pursuant to a schedule, and were anticipated to reach 
zero in January 2018 (FHFA OIG 2013).  
In December 2017, the Trump administration Treasury Department and the FHFA entered 
into a letter agreement that raised the maximum capital reserve amount for each firm from 
zero (as mandated by the third amendment) to $3 billion indefinitely, beginning in January 
2018 permitting the firms to again retain earnings. It’s not clear if this should be read as a 
definite shift from the prior administration’s “wind down” strategy for the firms. The letter 
further stipulated that $3 billion be added to the liquidation preference of the preferred 
stock (UST/Fannie 2017; Thompson 2021).  
On September 30, 2019, the FHFA and Treasury announced that they had amended the 
SPSPAs to permit GSEs to retain additional earnings in excess of the $3 billion capital 
reserves permitted under the third amendment. The letter agreement would permit Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac to maintain capital reserves of $25 billion and $20 billion, respectively. 
To compensate Treasury for the dividends that it would have received absent these 
amendments, the liquidation preferences for the SPS will gradually increase by the amount 
of the additional capital reserves until the liquidation preferences increase by $22 billion for 
















On November 18, 2020, the FHFA announced a final rule setting forth new capital 
requirements for the GSEs (2020 Enterprise Capital Rule) and on January 2021, the Treasury 
and the FHFA announced that they had further amended the SPSPAs to allow the GSEs to 
continue to accumulate reserves until they had satisfied the requirements of the rule (FHFA 
2020; FHFA 2021b). Based on their assets as of June 30, 2020, the firms would have been 
required to hold $283 billion in unadjusted total capital (Passy 2021). 
Since the beginning of the conservatorship and the SPSPA, many individuals and entities, 
mainly shareholders, have sought damages from the FHFA. Several of these cases are still 
unresolved (see discussion at “Evaluation” and accompanying footnotes). The 
conservatorship and the SPSPAs are still in effect.  
II. Key Design Decisions 
1. The passage of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA) on July 30, 2008, 
provided the legal authority to establish the SPSPA. 
The government passed HERA to enhance resolution and funding alternatives with respect 
to the GSEs in light of their severely weakened condition, their critical role in the stability of 
the mortgage and housing markets, and the stresses then impacting those markets. Prior to 
the passage of HERA, the OFHEO (the former GSE regulator) had no viable way to fund a 
conservatorship intervention, which rendered its conservatorship authority ineffective. 
HERA created a new regulator, the FHFA, and provided it with expanded authority over the 
GSEs. The new law also allowed Treasury to fund Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac for an 
emergency period (expiring December 31, 2009), thus ensuring their solvency. These 
emergency powers enabled Treasury to enter into the SPSPA, the MBS purchase program, 
and the credit facility. See Vergara (2021) and Zanger-Tishler and Wiggins (2021) for more 
information on the MBS purchase program and credit facility, respectively. 
2. The SPSPAs constituted one part of a four-part rescue plan for Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac. 
On September 7, 2008, the Treasury and FHFA announced a four-part intervention to 
stabilize the GSEs and maintain their solvency, consisting of (1) taking the firms into 
conservatorships, (2) entering into the SPSPA, (3) establishing the Credit Facility, and (4) 
launching the GSE MBS purchase program. Each component of the rescue plan was designed 
to address a particular set of constraints confronting the two GSEs. The SPSPAs were central 
to maintaining the solvency of the two firms, as it assured their positive net worth even with 
the likelihood of continued losses.  
3. Treasury structured the SPSPAs as “keepwell” agreements, allowing them to 
continue to fund the GSEs after December 31, 2009.  
As stated in HERA, Treasury’s emergency powers included “purchas[ing] any obligations and 
other securities issued by [Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac]” (Housing and Economic Recovery 
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Act 2008). These powers were unlimited as to amount but expired on December 31, 2009. 
The government could have funded the GSEs through continued purchases of debt or 
securities, similar to Treasury’s GSE MBS program, which purchased $225 billion of agency 
MBS ($220.8 billion face value) before expiring on December 31, 2009. (See Zanger-Tishler 
and Wiggins 2021). Yet no matter how large any such purchases might have been, they also 
would have had to cease as of December 31, 2009, leaving the GSEs with an uncertain future. 
The government sought to avoid this result, but no one could predict just how long the 
conservatorships would last or how much funding would be needed. Therefore, the FHFA 
and Treasury aimed to structure a funding mechanism that complied with HERA’s 
limitations and had maximum duration so that it would provide for the GSEs’ funding needs 
after December 31, 2009, should the conservatorships last that long (Jester et al. 2018). 
Designing the SPSPAs in the form of a “keep well”—an agreement typically entered into by a 
parent company wanting to guarantee the solvency of a subsidiary—allowed the FHFA and 
Treasury to fulfill these criteria. Instead of requiring continued purchases of any obligations 
or securities, the keep well agreement provided for a onetime sale of 1 million shares of 
SPS—with an initial Liquidation Preference of $1,000 per share—from each GSE to 
Treasury.7 In return, Treasury agreed to fund the GSEs through draws, with each draw 
increasing the aggregate Liquidation Preference, which would have to be paid to Treasury 
under certain circumstances.  
The variable Liquidation Preference of the SPS and its accompanying dividend formula were 
central to the SPSPA’s funding mechanism. In return for this commitment (among other 
considerations), the GSEs paid Treasury a 10% dividend (12% if delinquent) based on the 
previous quarter’s Liquidation Preference through 2012 (Fannie 2008a). Additional draws 
increased the Liquidation Preference, and the Treasury’s investment in the GSEs’ senior 
preferred stock. This avoided the need for additional purchases. By relying on an increasing 
Liquidity Preference, the SPSPAs facilitated continued funding of the GSEs and maintenance 
of their solvency even after December 31, 2009, without running afoul of HERA’s limitations 
(Jester et al. 2018).  
4. The GSEs set the SPS senior to all other common and preferred stock, but junior to 
senior and subordinated debt. 
Despite the absence of an explicit government guarantee, GSE MBS and debt had historically 
been viewed as safe based on an implied guarantee, that is, the assumption that the US 
government would back these securities in the event of a crisis (FCIC 2011, 316). As a result, 
and because of the size and global presence of the GSEs, it was thought that the failure to 
honor these obligations, in particular senior debt, could undermine investor confidence and 
even trigger a global credit crisis (Jester et al. 2018). 
Setting the SPS senior to all other stock but junior to all debt achieved the goal of protecting 
the GSEs’ creditors. Frame et al., among others, however, have questioned the government’s 
 
7 It is worth noting that during the crisis, the government often received preferred shares for its capital 
injections, for example, American International Group and the bank investments under TARP.  
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decision to protect not only senior debt but also subordinated debt. They suggest that 
haircutting these creditors, for example, might have promoted good market discipline, 
“signaling that [subordinated] debt is indeed risky” and “curbing moral hazard in similar 
institutions going forward” (Frame et al. 2015).   
When asked about this in an interview with the Yale Program on Financial Stability, former 
OFHEO Director James Lockhart, III suggested that the government knowingly accepted the 
risk of perpetuating moral hazard in light of the far greater risks involved with wiping out 
these creditors (Lockhart 2018). Treasury and FHFA legal counsel were convinced that 
imposing losses on junior creditors, which would have been consistent with market 
discipline, might not be possible in isolation. More specifically, they advised that doing so 
might also trigger “a cross-default on senior debt and [potentially even GSE] mortgage-
backed securities.” Rescuing the GSEs on such terms would have risked triggering the exact 
kind of systemic crisis that the government intervened to prevent (Lockhart 2018). 
Despite the perceived unfeasibility of imposing losses on creditors, the government saw the 
need to provide some level of protection for the taxpayers’ investment. That being the case, 
the GSEs placed the SPS senior to all other common and preferred stock. Shareholders hotly 
contested this arrangement, as it caused them to lose almost all of the value of their 
investment. In anticipation of such losses, Treasury asked banking regulators to look into 
potential consequences for banks holding large quantities of preferred shares. Banking 
regulators conducted a review and concluded that no systemic consequences would arise 
from losses borne by these banks (Lockhart 2018). A number of smaller banks, however, 
were significantly affected, and 15 failures and two distressed mergers of small banks either 
directly or indirectly resulted from the takeover (Lockhart 2018; Rice and Rose 2016). 
5. The SPSPAs carried a 10% dividend and a penalty if delinquent. 
Jester et al., who took part in designing the SPSPA, say the dividend rate was chosen “based 
on a review of the market for similar securities” (Jester et al. 2018). If a GSE failed to pay a 
dividend on time, the rate reset to 12% until all overdue dividends were paid in full. 
6. Treasury originally capped funding under the SPSPAs at $100 billion per GSE. 
Given the absence of consensus on the GSE’s funding needs, Treasury had asked for and 
received under HERA authority to fund the GSEs in an unlimited amount through December 
31, 2009, subject only to the federal debt ceiling, which the law had raised by $800 billion to 
accommodate the rescue (HERA Section 3083, Jester et al. 2018, 4, 9). In designing the SPSPA, 
the Treasury sought to provide funding for each GSE that was large enough to “eliminate any 
reasonable concern.” However, there was concern about setting the amount too high (doing 
so might signal that the problems were larger than they really were), and legal counsel 
advised against making an unlimited commitment (Jester et al. 2018, 9-10). Thus, officials 
settled on $100 billion per GSE, as this amount exceeded most market projections of their 
losses at the time (Jester et al. 2018, 9-10). Even if $100 billion per GSE proved to be 
inadequate, Treasury believed the incoming administration could amend the SPSPAs to raise 
the cap, if needed (Jester et al. 2018, 9-10).  
336




7. The SPSPAs capped the GSEs’ portfolios at $850 billion (later increased to $900 
billion) and then mandated gradual portfolio reduction. 
Defaults on subprime and Alt-A mortgages in Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s mortgage 
portfolios had contributed to the GSEs’ losses during the crisis (FCIC 2011). The SPSPAs 
initially limited the portfolio cap for each GSE to $850 billion, and later raised it $900 
billion, because officials recognized that the GSEs needed to continue purchasing loans in 
order to keep the secondary mortgage market from collapsing (Treasury 2008b). 
Secretary of the Treasury Henry M. Paulson, Jr., argued that the portfolio cap would 
“promote stability in the secondary mortgage market and lower the cost of funding, 
[since] the GSEs will modestly increase their MBS portfolios through the end of 2009” 
(Treasury 2008b). After the GSEs had supported the market through the most severe 
period of the crisis, the SPSPAs were amended to require the GSEs to begin to wind down 
their portfolios to reduce systemic risk (Treasury 2008b). Paulson commented on this 
change—“In 2010 [GSE] portfolios will begin to be gradually reduced at the rate of 10 
percent per year, largely through natural run off, eventually stabilizing at a lower, less 
risky size” (Treasury 2008b).  
8. The SPSPAs capped the GSEs’ debt at 110% of their precrisis debt, then raised the 
debt limit to 120% of their portfolios, mandating a gradual reduction to begin in 
2010.  
Under the SPSPA, the GSEs could not increase their debt levels to more than 110% of 
their debt on June 30, 2008. The first amendment, passed on May 6, 2009, raised the debt 
limit to 120% of the portfolio cap. Operating in conjunction with a mandatory decrease 
of the portfolio, the debt cap decreased by 10% annually beginning in 2010 (UST/Fannie 
2009a). The third amendment accelerated the decrease from 10% to 15% (UST/Fannie 
2012). 
 
Treasury and the FHFA recognized that the GSEs required adequate leverage to purchase 
and hold mortgages in their portfolios. Since the GSEs were obligated to reduce their 
portfolios, the FHFA limited outstanding debt as a percentage of the GSE’s portfolio.  
9. In addition to the caps on debt and portfolios, the SPSPAs required the GSEs to 
abide by certain covenants restricting their operations. 
Without Treasury’s approval, the GSEs and the FHFA, as conservator, could not: 
1) Pay dividends on any class of stock other than the Senior Preferred Stock,  
2) Issue common or preferred stock,  
3) Enter into a contract with any affiliate of Treasury,  
4) End the conservatorship, unless the FHFA moved the GSEs into receivership, 
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5) Sell, convey, or transfer any of its assets, unless the transaction constituted “the 
ordinary course of business,” 
6) Merge with another entity, 
7) Avoid compliance with SEC deadlines for 10-K, 8-K, and other reports, or  
8) Enter into new executive compensation arrangements (UST/Fannie 2009a). 
10.  The SPSPAs included a Periodic Commitment Fee, but Treasury initially waived 
and then suspended it.  
Under the SPSPA, the GSEs were required to pay a quarterly Periodic Commitment Fee, 
accruing from January 1, 2010, and payable quarterly beginning March 31, 2010, to 
compensate Treasury for its ongoing commitment (UST/Fannie 2009a). The FHFA and 
Treasury, in consultation with the Federal Reserve, were to decide the amount of the 
Periodic Commitment Fee, which would be applicable for a five-year period (and reset every 
five years) (UST/Fannie 2009a). Treasury could, in its discretion, waive the Periodic 
Commitment Fee in 2010 and at the beginning of each subsequent quarter based on adverse 
conditions in the mortgage market (UST/Fannie 2009a). The GSE could, at its discretion, 
choose not to pay the Periodic Commitment Fee but have it added to the aggregate 
Liquidation Preference (UST/Fannie 2009a). Since the GSEs continued to post losses into 
2012, Treasury waived the commitment fee for each quarter beginning in March 2010 until 
it suspended the fee with the third amendment (UST/Fannie 2012). 
11.  The third amendment, which was entered into on August 17, 2012, switched 
dividend payments from a fixed rate to a variable rate. 
The FHFA identified two factors in its decision to implement a variable dividend. For one, 
this approach, which provided the GSEs and Treasury with more flexibility, eliminated the 
need for the GSEs to borrow from Treasury to pay dividends, a practice that increased the 
Liquidation Preference, and by extension, future dividend payments under the SPSPAs 
(FHFA 2012). FHFA director Edward DeMarco argued that the new approach increased 
market confidence (FHFA 2012). Secondly, the FHFA asserted that Fannie Mae’s and Freddie 
Mac’s earnings would be “used to benefit taxpayers,” as taxpayer money had sustained the 
GSEs (FHFA 2012).  
This new formula was not without risk to Treasury; dividends became dependent on the 
GSEs being profitable. If the GSEs did not realize profits, they did not pay the dividend. 
This was the case for Freddie Mac in fourth quarter 2015 and second quarter 2016 (see 
Appendix B).   
 
The variable dividend was also part of a larger initiative that aimed to build a new 
infrastructure for the secondary mortgage market in contemplation of a significant 
shrinking of the GSEs’ operations and role. An additional significant factor was the 
required reduction of the GSEs’ capital reserves (Thompson and Wiggins 2021).  
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12.  While the third amendment required a reduction in the GSEs’ capital reserves to 
zero, the December 2017 letter agreement raised the capital reserves to $3 billion 
for an indefinite period of time.  
The third amendment also capped the GSEs capital reserves at $3 billion (beginning in 
2013) and required reductions of $600 million annually until they reached zero in 
January 2018. At that point, the GSEs would depend solely on Treasury funds to cover 
any losses (UST/Fannie 2012). The reduction in GSE capital reserves in 2012 seemed to 
align with the Obama administration’s interest in shrinking the GSEs’ operations and 
their role in the secondary mortgage market but also might have complicated any plan to 
have them exit from conservatorship (Thompson and Wiggins 2021).  
 
By 2017, the administration had changed, and the FHFA and GSEs sought amendments 
to the SPSPA. By letter agreement dated December 21, 2017, Treasury and the FHFA 
agreed to raise the maximum capital reserve amount from zero to $3 billion indefinitely, 
beginning in January 2018 (UST/Fannie 2017). The amendment was intended to permit 
the GSEs “to maintain a limited capital buffer in an amount that should be sufficient to 
cover income fluctuations in the normal course of business” (UST/Fannie 2017). It is 
unlikely that the change was instituted to help the GSEs prepare for exiting the 
conservatorship, since the letter agreement mandated that the GSEs also increase the 
Liquidation Preference of their respective SPS by $3 billion, which the firms have to pay 
down before exiting the SPSPAs (UST/Fannie 2017). Treasury also asserted that the GSEs 
could maintain a $3 billion capital buffer only for as long as they continued to pay 
dividends (UST/Fannie 2017). (Also see “Outcomes” for discussion of later amendments 
to the SPSPA.) 
13.  To protect the taxpayers’ investment, Treasury received a warrant to purchase up 
to 79.9% of GSE stock at any point during the warrant’s 20-year lifetime. 
In addition to the purchase of SPS, Treasury also received under the SPSPAs (among 
other considerations) a warrant to purchase up to 79.9% of the common stock of each 
GSE for a nominal amount at any point during the warrant’s 20-year term, offering 
taxpayers significant upside in the event the GSEs were restored to viability (Treasury 
2008a). 
 
A maximum of 79.9% of all shares was chosen in consideration of an accounting rule that 
would require the federal government to take the GSEs onto its balance sheet if it 
acquired a stake in them of 80% or more. Jester et al. (2018) have insisted that, absent 
this rule, the authors, who served as financial regulators and designed the SPSPAs during 
the crisis, would have sought to give taxpayers full ownership of the GSEs. The authors 
opted for warrants to purchase only 79.9% of all shares, however, because they believed 
that the risk of “adding trillions of GSE debt and guarantees to the federal balance sheet” 
far outweighed any potential benefit of owning an additional 20% of shares (Jester et al. 
2018).  
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14.  Treasury and the FHFA operated the SPSPAs with transparency to reassure GSE 
bondholders, the market, and American taxpayers. 
The FHFA and Treasury circulated press releases and detailed reports as part of their 
transparency policies. Treasury and the FHFA announced amendments to the SPSA when 
agreed to even though they might take months to become effective, allowing the market to 
adjust to the announced changes before they were instituted. For example, most components 
of the third amendment—executed in August 2012—did not take effect until first quarter 
2013. Treasury and the FHFA also made copies of each amendment easily accessible via their 
websites (FHFA 2021a). 
Treasury and FHFA officials underscored the importance of protecting taxpayers in their 
reports and public statements. During Treasury’s announcement of the GSE intervention, 
Treasury and Secretary Paulson stressed that protecting the taxpayer remained one of 
Treasury’s chief priorities (Treasury 2008a; 2008b). In February 2010, Edward DeMarco, 
then acting director of the FHFA, wrote a letter to Congress acknowledging that taxpayer 
funds kept Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac operating (DeMarco 2010). DeMarco also pledged 
to outline how the FHFA had limited, and would limit, GSE losses (DeMarco 2010). DeMarco 
later argued that the third amendment was enacted mostly to protect taxpayers (FHFA 
2012).  
III. Evaluation 
The SPSPAs were crucial to maintaining the GSEs’ positive net worth throughout the crisis 
and while in conservatorship. The system of draws that Treasury and the FHFA created 
under the SPSPA, which could extend beyond December 31, 2009, guaranteed that the firms 
remained solvent. Despite this success, the variable dividend formula in the third 
amendment has generated controversy within the academic community, with shareholders, 
and in other corners.   
Scholars are divided over the legality of the variable dividend formula in the third 
amendment. Solomon and Zaring (2015) argue that the new dividend formula, which 
redirected all net earnings to Treasury, violates aspects of corporate and administrative law. 
They claim that Treasury and the FHFA surmounted the normal administrative hurdles faced 
by shareholders when the government agencies instituted the variable dividend formula. 
They also assert that the government’s decision to conduct a net sweep of profits constituted 
a violation of interest, as the FHFA and Treasury—the architects of the dividend formula—
also oversaw the GSEs. These scholars question the extent to which government agencies 
can enact emergency measures that circumvent standard corporate and administrative legal 
proceedings (Solomon and Zaring 2015).  
Frame et al. (2015) acknowledge that from 2008 through third quarter 2014, the GSEs have 
paid more to Treasury in dividends ($275.9 billion) than they have received in draws ($187.5 
billion). Nonetheless, they contend that a comparison of nominal cash flows between the 
GSEs and Treasury does not mean that the GSEs have repaid Treasury, and by extension, the 
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taxpayers. Instead, Frame et al. (2015) highlight that Treasury assumed a substantial risk 
with the intervention and is owed a risk premium. They note that Treasury’s guarantee to 
maintain the GSEs’ solvency lowered the GSEs’ funding costs, thus increasing their profits. 
They also note that Treasury never collected a commitment fee, which would have reduced 
the GSEs’ profits (Frame et al. 2015).  
Wall (2014) makes a stronger case than Frame. Wall argues that Treasury, not the common 
stockholders, faced higher risks. Shareholders could lose only their investment, which was 
purchased on the secondary market. Treasury, on the other hand, could lose an unlimited 
amount. 
The claim that the taxpayers and Treasury have been fully repaid for their support of Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac is based on an accounting calculation that does not withstand 
economic analysis. The claim that Treasury's commitment has been fully repaid attributes 
no dividend payments to Treasury starting in 2012, attributes no value to the government 
guarantee to absorb whatever losses arose in the preconservatorship book of business, and 
arguably reflects Treasury setting too low of a dividend rate on its senior preferred stock. 
Moreover, the profits that are being used to pay the dividends did not arise from the 
contributions of private shareholders but rather entirely reflect risks borne by the Treasury 
and taxpayers (Wall 2014). 
The new dividend formula also engendered a substantial backlash from shareholders, 
resulting in several lawsuits. These lawsuits argue, among other things, that Treasury knew 
that the GSEs were going to become profitable around 2012 and changed the agreements to 
sweep profits (Light 2017).8 Four US Courts of Appeals have dismissed shareholder suits on 
this issue, and on February 20, 2018, the US Supreme Court declined to review the case from 
the D.C Circuit.9  
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Fannie Mae Preferred Stock Certificate – Outlines basic tenets of the program, including 
dividend payment schedule, commitment fees, pay on Liquidation Preference, and the initial 
purchase of $1 billion in Senior Preferred Stock from Fannie Mae to Treasury.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/fannie-mae-preferred-stock-certificate. 
Freddie Mac Preferred Stock Certificate – Outlines basic tenets of the program, including 
dividend payment schedule, commitment fees, pay on Liquidation Preference, and the initial 
purchase of $1 billion in Senior Preferred Stock from Freddie Mac to Treasury.   
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/4428. 
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA §1117) – Legally authorizes Treasury 
and the FHFA to establish the SPSPA.   
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/housing-and-economic-recovery-act-2008. 
Second Amendment to Amended and Restated Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement: 
Fannie (UST/Fannie 2009b) – Increases Treasury’s funding cap to $200 billion less 
aggregate draws plus a new formula, which included all net worth deficits from 2010 
through 2012 minus any surplus that would exist on December 31, 2012. Pushes 
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commitment fee start date back to January 1, 2011.   
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/second-amendment-amended-and-restated-senior-
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1, 2011.   
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/second-amendment-amended-and-restated-senior-
preferred-stock-purchase-agreement-freddie. 
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Fannie (UST/Fannie 2012) – Amendment that authorizes Treasury to receive all future 
dividend payments from the GSEs; annually lowers the GSEs’ capital reserves to zero.   
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/document/third-amendment-amended-and-restated-
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Opinion on Federal Obligation to SPSPAs – Opinion finding that GSE debtholders can sue 
Treasury if Treasury fails to provide a requested draw.   
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/opinion-federal-obligation-spspa. 
Press Releases/Announcements 
Changes to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements (FHFA 2012) 
– Announces the third amendment and provides the rationale for the amendment.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/changes-fannie-mae-and-freddie-mac-preferred-stock-
purchase-agreements. 
Meeting the Challenges of the Financial Crisis – Lockhart’s speech outlines what the FHFA, 
Treasury, and the Fed did in the first six months of conservatorship.   
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/meeting-challenges-financial-crisis. 
Statement by Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr., on Treasury and Federal Housing Finance 
Agency Action to Protect Financial Markets and Taxpayers – Treasury press release that 









The Fannie and Freddie Document Trove (Forbes 08/02/2017) – Pointed to newly released 
documents as proof that Treasury knew that GSEs were going to become profitable around 
2012 and changed the agreement to sweep profits.   
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/fannie-freddie-document-treasure-trove. 
Understanding the Fannie/Freddie Takeover (NPR 09/09/2008) – Generally outlines the 
media reaction and level of public understanding just after the government rescue (including 
the SPSPA) was enacted.   
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/4452. 
US Foresaw Better Return in Seizing Fannie and Freddie Profits (NYT 07/23/2017) – Pointed 
to newly released documents as proof that Treasury knew that GSEs were going to become 
profitable around 2012 and changed the agreement to sweep profits.   
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/4451. 
Key Academic Papers 
After the Deal: Fannie, Freddie, and the Financial Crisis Aftermath (Davidoff Solomon and 
Zaring 2015) – Explains the legal ramifications of the conservatorship, with particular 
emphasis on the third amendment.   
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/3364. 
The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Frame et al. 2015) – Comprehensive paper that 
addresses the causes of the conservatorship and evaluates the program’s efficacy in the short 
run and the long run.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/3415. 
Reports/Assessments 
Analysis of the 2012 Amendments to the Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements 
(FHFA OIG 2013) – Evaluates the variable dividend payment and its potential implications for 
taxpayers, debtors, and the market.   
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/3441. 
GSEs and the Government’s Role in Housing Finance: Issues for the 113th Congress – 
Discusses various options of restructuring the government’s intervention of the GSEs.   
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/3422. 
Housing Finance at a Glance: A Monthly Chartbook – Includes annualized data on market 
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1) Cumulative draws may not add up because of rounding. 
2) Excludes the $1 billion Liquidation Preference from each GSE at the SPSPA’s inception. The SPSPAs never recognized the initial 
$1 billion as a draw.  
3) Red denotes peak draws. 
Source: FHFA 2019. 
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Appendix B: Dividends on Senior Preferred Stock Received by Treasury (in billions of USD) 
Notes:  
1) Units in billions of USD  
2) Cumulative dividends paid may not add up because of rounding. 
3) Red divides the original and variable dividend formulas. 
Source: FHFA 2019.  
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